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FRAUD - ELEMENTS - PLEADING- JUSTICE COURT PRACTICE-
Strainar vs. Vendetti, et al.-No. 13865-Decided January 13,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Vendetti had judgment in Justice Court against Strainar for defi-
ciency after foreclosure of a mortgage upon an automobile. Strainar
appealed to County Court and recovered judgment for full balance and
on a directed verdict following sustaining of a demurrer to a written
statement of defense based upon fraud, but which on its face failed to
set forth all the necessary elements of fraud.
HELD: 1. A defense in the court below on the theory of fraud
cannot be abandoned in the higher court for another theory. Such
abandonment of the theory constitutes an abandonment of the cause.
2. While pleadings are not required in Justice Court, yet on
appeal where a statement is made by defendant that the defense is fraud,
the trial court had power to require such defense be stated orally or in
writing so that it could determine whether such defense was available
and where such statement omitted some of the necessary elements, a
demurrer was properly sustained.-Judgment affirmed.
LANDLORD AND TENANT-HOLDING OVER-SUBSTITUTED LEASE-
CONFLICTING EVIDENCE-The Alamosa Realty Investment and
Theatre Company vs. The Gordon Stores Company, Inc.-No.
13593-Decided January 13, 1936---Opinion by Mr. Justice
Young.
Plaintiff below recovered judgment against defendnat for rent to
end of term of a written lease extended to April 30, 1933. It sought
also to recover additional rent for another year on theory that defendant
had placed a subtenant in possession and that defendant was holding
over. Defense was that subsequent parties in possession were not sub-
tenants of defendant, but were tenants of plaintiff under a new agree-
ment. Both theories were submitted to the jury.
HELD: Where the theory of both plaintiff and defendant were
submitted to jury by appropriate instructions, a verdict rendered upon
conflicting evidence will not be disturbed.--Judgment affirmed.
JUVENILE DEPENDENCY-LIABILITY OF FATHER FOR CARE OF UN-
BORN CHILD AND MOTHER-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-Metzger
vs. The People-No. 13838-Decided January 6, 1936-Opin-
ion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Defendant below was convicted in the Juvenile Court of being the
father of an unborn child and was ordered to pay thirty per cent of his
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earnings for the care of the expectant mother and child. He attacks the
constitutionality of the law.
1. The original Juvenile Act passed in 1907 in defining what a
dependent child was did not refer to an unborn child. In 1923 the
statute was amended to include unborn child. The amendment was
germane to the original title, hence the amendment was constitutional.
2. The policy of legislation is for determining by the General
Assembly and not by the courts. When the respondent complained of
the amendment it had been on the statute books for twelve years. He
could not have been surprised or prejudiced under these circumstances.-
Judgment affirmed.
INHERITANCE TAX-TRANSFERS MORE THAN ONE YEAR PRIOR TO
DEATH-PLEADINGS-DEMURRER-The People vs. Estate of
William S. Hadfield-No. 13620-Decided December 30, 1935
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Bouck.
Demurrer to petition filed by the State of Colorado to appraise
after discovered assets and to assess an additional inheritance tax thereon
was sustained in the County Court.
1. The petition stated a cause of action.
2. A petition, stating among other things that the transfer of
real estate was made by the deceased to his wife more than one year
prior to his death without valuable or adequate consideration, states a
cause of action.
3. The proviso in the statute with reference to transfers made
within one year prior to death simply creates a legal presumption which
dispenses with the production of further evidence when the transfer is
shown to have occurred not more than one year before death. It leaves
earlier transfers to be proved in the usual way.
4. Nor will the state be deprived of the right to prove, if it can,
that in this particular case the grantor died within a year after the trans-
fer was completed by delivery of the deed.-Judgment reversed.
DIVORCE- INTERLOCUTORY DECREE- SETTING ASIDE AFTER
DEATH-PROPERTY SETTLEMENT-Morris, Administrator vs.
Propst-No. 13857-Decided January 6, 1936--Opinion by Mr.
Justice Bouck.
Husband and wife in contemplation of divorce proceedings entered
into written contract settling their respective property rights and relin-
quishing further claim to each other's property. An interlocutory de-
cree of divorce was entered in favor of the wife. Before the six months
ensued she died and her husband filed an unverified motion to set aside
the interlocutory decree, which was granted.
1. The demurrer of the husband to the amended answer of the
administrator, which, among other things, plead the complete property
settlement between the parties, should not have been sustained.
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2. Where the settlement contract between the parties provided,
among other things, "that in case at any time in the future a decree of
divorce shall be granted to either of the parties hereto, that a copy of this
agreement may be filed with the court in which such divorce decree is
entered, and shall be considered as a full and complete adjudication of
the property rights of the parties hereto." It would be hard to make
these words mean anything else than that both spouses then and there
relinquished further claim to each other's property.
3. The trial court took the view that in order to effectuate the
contract it was necessary to file the latter with the divorce court. The
contract was merely directory and does not create a forfeit in the event
of its not being so filed and the trial court erred in describing a manda-
tory character to this provision.
4. We cannot approve of the attempt here made after the death
of the wife to set aside an interlocutory decree recovered by her in a
divorce suit against a surviving husband on his mere unsupported mo-
tion, the only ground of which is his own desire to have it set aside.
This is no legal ground.---Judgment reversed.
WILLS---SPECIFIC PERFORMANCE TO MAKE A WILL-Ballou vs.
First National Bank of Colorado Springs-No. 13688-Decided
December 23, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Suit for specific performance of alleged oral contract to make will
whereby plaintiff was to receive certain property. Deceased died leaving
a will which was admitted to probate without objection by plaintiff,
who filed a claim in County Court for services rendered; the claim was
denied, and no appeal was taken. Thereafter this suit brought in Dis-
trict Court.
HELD: Plaintiff has no right to litigate in the District Court
matters that were settled in County Court. The evidence was the same
in both courts and was insufficient to establish the claim for specific
performance.---Judgment affirmed.
PLEADING AND PRACTICE-FILING AMENDED COMPLAINT-Young-
berg vs. Canal Co. etc.-No. 13769-Decided December 23, 1935
-- Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard, on Supersedeas.
Plaintiff petitioned for receiver in 1910, appointment made and
assets of Canal Company sold to one Johnson in 1915. Johnson trans-
ferred to Butte Valley Company and assets taken under execution
against Butte Company in 1924 and sold to one Dick. In 1933 and
1934 plaintiff filed amended petition for receiver, without leave of court,
praying for new receiver.
HELD: Trial court was right in striking amended petition from
files, there having been no leave granted to file same. The filing of an
amended petition for complaint rests within the sound discretion of the
trial court.-Judgment affirmed.
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PHOTOGRAPHS-PERSONAL PRIVACY-USE OF FOR ADVERTISING
PURPOSES WITHOUT CONSENT-McCreery vs. Miller's Grocer-
teria Company, et al.-No. 13636-Decided February 3, 1936-
Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Campbell.
McCreery brought this action against the defendants to recover
money judgment for damages for humiliation and mental suffering in
using her photograph for advertising purposes without her consent or
approval. Demurrers to the complaint for insufficient facts were sus-
tained and plaintiff elected to stand on her complaint. Dismissal entered.
1. The complaint stated a cause of action.
2. The photographer was under an implied contract not to make
a commercial use of plaintiff's photograph which he had taken and his
co-defendants are jointly liable with him in using the photograph for
advertising purposes without the consent or approval of the plaintiff,
where the nature of the photographer's calling was such as to put them
on their inquiry as to the right to use the photograph.
3. When the plaintiff employed the defendant, Ware, as a photog-
rapher to take her picture an implied contract arose that he would not
make a commercial use of the picture. The defendants violated that
implied contract by making commercial use thereof without her consent.
Judgment reversed. Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissent.
RAPE---SUFFICIENCY OF INFORMATION-EVIDENCE-INSTRUCTIONS
-Brock vs. The People-No. 13882-Decided February 3, 1936
-Opinion by Mr. Justice Burke.
Brock was convicted in the court below of statutory rape.
1. The supporting affidavit to the information for rape made by
the mother of the prosecuting witness need not be made on personal
knowledge of the commission of the act.
2. There was sufficient evidence that the prosecutrix was un-
married.
3. There was ample corroboration of the act which is furnished
by time, place and circumstances and status of the defendant.
4. It was proper to ask the defendant on cross examination if he
was married.
5. Where defendant was cross examined, over objection, as to
the conduct of a male companion at the time and place of the alleged
rape, while this was not part of the res jestae it was admissible as
bearing upon the frame of mind and intent of defendant and the prob-
able relations of the parties.
6. Evidence that the defendant sought the prosecuting witness
at her home and interviewed her after the alleged defense was admis-
sible.
7. Instructions examined and approved.--Judgment affirmed.
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LIQUORS-LICENSE-DISCRETION OF CITY COUNCIL-HOME RULE
CITY-Houston vs. Gilman-No. 13777-Decided February 3,
1936--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Campbell.
The plaintiff, Gilman, who had theretofore requested the mayor
and city council of Boulder to grant and issue to him a liquor license
which was refused, brought mandamus to compel issuance. The alter-
native writ was issued. The demurrer of defendants being overruled.
They elected to stand on the demurrer and decree was entered that the
license be issued.
1. Article 22 of the Constitution was amended November 8,
1932, and this amendment was in force at the time Gilman applied for
his license.
2. Article 22, as amended, repealed all former liquor laws and
that from and after July 1, 1933, the legislature by statutory regu-
lations could regulate the manufacture and sale of liquor throughout
the state and pursuant to this amendment the general liquor law being
Chapter 142 of the Session Laws of 1935, were enacted.
3. The City of Boulder, a so-called "home rule city," is subject
to the provisions of Chapter 142 of the Session Laws of 1935.
4. Therefore, it is within the reasonable discretion of its city
council to grant or refuse applications for the sale of liquor therein.
5. There is no showing in the record that the city council has
abused its discretion or exceeded its authority in such refusal. It seems
to have acted in the premises according to law and its own conception of
right and duty in refusing permission to Gilman of the right to sell
liquors in Boulder-Reversed and remanded.
Mr. Justice Holland dissents. Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice
Bouck think that the case has become moot and therefore the writ of
error should be dismissed.
LIQUORS-LICENSE-DISCRETION OF COUNTY COMMISSIONERS-
MANDAMUS-Van De Vegt vs. Board of County Commissioners
of Larimer County-No. 13818-Decided February 3, 1936-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Young.
Van De Vegt sought to procure from the County Court of Larimer
County a writ of mandamus to compel the Board of County Commis-
sioners to issue a liquor license permitting him to sell liquor in his
drug store 700 feet south of the southern city limits of Fort Collins on
the Fort Collins-Loveland highway. The County Court denied the
writ.
1. The liquor act being chapter 142 of the Session Laws of
1935, provides among other things that the board of county commis-
sioners shall have authority to refuse to issue a license for good cause.
2. The right to refuse for good cause of necessity vests in it in the
first instance the right to determine what is good cause for refusal.
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3. Where it so refuses, the action is subject to review to ascertain
whether its action was capricious or arbitrary.
4. Capricious or arbitrary exercise of discretion by an administra-
tive board can arise in only three ways:
a. By neglecting or refusing to use reasonable diligence and care
to procure such evidence as it is by law authorized to consider in exercis-
ing the discretion vested in it.
b. By failing to give candid and honest consideration of the
evidence before it.
c. By exercising its discretion in such manner as to indicate that
its action is based on conclusions from the evidence such that reason-
able men fairly and honestly considering the evidence must reach con'
trary conclusions.
5. Evidence examined and held that the action of the board
was not a capricious or arbitrary exercise of its discretion in refusing to
grant the license.
6. A case is not moot where interests of a public character are
asserted under conditions that it may be immediately repeated, merely
because the time for a particular order has expired.-Judgment affirmed.
Ar. Justice Holland dissents. Mr. Justice Butler and Mr. Justice
Bouck dissent on the grounds that the case has become moot and for
that reason the writ of error should be dismissed.
ARBITRATION-IMPEACHMENT OF AWARD---GROUNDS OF-Noff-
singer vs. Thompson-No. 13605- Decided February 3, 1936-
Opinion by Mr. Justice Hilliard.
In an action by one party against another for an accounting, the
issue was whether defendant was indebted to plaintiff and, if so, in
what sum. The matter was submitted to arbitration under Chapter 27,
Code of Civil Procedure. By determination of two of arbitrators, plain-
tiff was denied recovery and he sought to impeach the award on the
grounds that one of the arbitrators joining in the award proposed from
the beginning to decide in favor of the defendant and so expressed
himself irrespective of the evidence. Impeachment denied below:
I. An arbitrator is an agent of both parties alike and is bound to
exercise a high degree of impartiality, without the slighest degree of
friendship or favor toward either party.
2. If arbitrators conduct themselves with bias or partiality, this
amounts in law to misconduct which will warrant the setting aside of
the award.
3. Section 320 of the code provides that an adjudication by
arbitrators may be "set aside for fraud or other sufficient cause."
4. The arbitrator having misconceived his duty, his participa-
tion brought about injustice and required abrogation of the award.-
Judgment reversed.
Mr. Chief Justice Campbell dissents.
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INSURANCE - ACCIDENT- DOUBLE INDEMNITY, SUICIDE--Capitol
Life Co. vs. Di Iullo--No. 13778-Decided December 23, 1935
-- Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Insurance policy issued and as a part thereof contained a double
indemnity provision in case of accidental death, excluding suicide, while
sane or insane. Premium of $7.50 was paid annually. Trial court
directed verdict in accordance with Section 2532, C. L. 1921.
HELD: There are two elements necessary to a recovery: One,
death of the insured; two, an accident. Suicide while sane is not an
accident. Section 2532 does not apply when a policy provides for the
payment of money upon accidental death and the insured commits sui-
cide while sane.--Judgment reversed with instruction to dismiss.
AUTOMOBILES-DRIVER AND PEDESTRIAN-INSTRUCTIONS-DAM-
AGES-Sherman vs. Ross-No. 13678-Decided December 23,
1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
Action by a pedestrian against motorist. Plaintiff was struck and
injured while crossing an intersection in Denver. The court instructed
the jury that the amount of care by law exacted of the motorist is far
greater than that exacted of the pedestrian, that the pedestrian may
assume care on the part of the motorist, that an automobile is a machine
capable of doing great damage, and that the jury in computing the
damage might consider future medical expenses. The court refused to
instruct that the motorist might assume care on the part of the pedes-
trian and that the motorist would not be liable if the accident be found
to be unavoidable. Verdict and judgment below were for plaintiff.
1. The negligence instruction as given imposed too high a duty
upon the motorist and should have been complemented by the instruc-
tions tendered on the duty of the pedestrian and the result if the acci-
dent were found unavoidable.
2. In the absence of evidence, the instruction on damages should
not have permitted the consideration of future medical expenses.-
Judgment reversed.
Mr. Justice Hilliard and Mr. Justice Bouck dissenting. Mr. Chief
Justice Butler not participating.
PAYMENT-ATTORNEY AND CLIENT-PAROL EVIDENCE RULE--
JUSTICE COURTS-McCaffrey vs. Mitchell-No. 13 5 3 6-Decided
December 23, 1935-Opinion by Mr. Justice Youig.
Action by the payee against the maker of a promissory note secured
by deed of trust. Three defenses were raised: First, that the payee of
the note orally agreed to look only to the real property for payment;
second, that the payee accepted an assignment of the maker's claim
against another as payment; third, that a prior suit in the Justice Court
for collection of the note was pending. Judgment below was for de-
fendant on the verdict of the jury.
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1. There was no evidence that the payee of the note either ex-
pressly or impliedly accepted the assignment. An attorney by virtue of
his employment is without authority to release or discharge a claim
belonging to his client. It was therefore error to submit this issue to
the jury.
2. It is not permissible to show a parol agreement of the payee
not to enforce payment against the maker of commercial paper, nor to
show an agreement to require payment only out of a particular fund.
3. There was no prior suit pending. Neither party appeared in
the Justice-Court and, under Section 6056, Compiled Laws, 1921, the
case was automatically dismissed.-Reversed with instructions to enter
judgment for plaintiff.
Mr. Justice Hilliard, Mr. Justice Bouck and Mr. Justice Holland
dissenting.
INSURANCE--SUICIDE AS A DEFENSE-Occidental Life Insurance Co.
vs. United States National Bank-No. 13459-Decided December
23, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Chief Justice Butler.
Action on life insurance policy providing for double indemnity if
insured should die as the result of sustaining bodily injuries (except in
case of suicide while sane or insane) effected by the happening of a
purely accidental event. Insured met death under circumstances indicat-
ing suicide. There was no evidence of insanity. The trial court di-
rected a verdict against the insurance company.
1. If insured committed suicide while sane, Section 2532, Com-
piled Laws, 1921, does not apply and the insurance company is not
liable.
2. There is a presumption against suicide, but that presumption
may b overcome by direct or circumstantial evidence.
3. It was error to reject evidence tending to show a motive for
suicide.
4. Death certificate indicating that insured's death was suicidal
was admissible.--Judgment reversed and cause remanded for new trial.
STATUTES-CONSTRUCTION-EVIDENCE--City and County of Den-
ver vs. Commissioners of Logan County, et at.-No. 13720-
Decided December 16, 1935--Opinion by Mr. Justice Holland.
The city of Denver brought this action under Section 8914, C. L.
1921, which in substance provides for the payment of a sum of money
by a county which intentionally shall bring and leave any pauper or
paupers in any other county wherein such pauper is not lawfully settled,
knowing them to be paupers. Judgment below was for the defendant
on the merits of the case.
1. The record reviewed and the evidence found to be insufficient
to justify a finding for the plaintiff as provided for in the statutes.
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2. The statute on which this action is based is penal in character
and, therefore, is to be strictly construed.
3. The findings of the lower court were based upon evidence
amply sufficient to sustain such findings and, under the well settled rule,
the findings will not be disturbed.--Judgment is right and will be af-
firmed.
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